Upon examining the language used in recent SEC filings, we find that severance agreements are often paid whether or not the CEO leaves the firm due to a change in control. We hypothesize that since severance agreements compensate CEOs in the event of termination, CEOs with these agreements will have an incentive to increase firm risk and decrease effort. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that the adoption of a severance agreement is associated with an increase in firm risk, a higher likelihood of CEO turnover, and a lower operating performance. We also document a significant positive relation between the use of severance agreements and the cost of debt; firms in which the CEO has a severance agreement have yield spreads which are approximately 10% higher than firms without these agreements. The results hold after controlling for endogeneity, the probability of takeover, and whether the firm has investment or noninvestment grade debt. Overall, the evidence suggests that the effects of severance agreements extend beyond takeovers, and that these additional implications are primarily negative for the firm and for debt holders in particular.
I. Introduction
Senior executive compensation packages often contain large severance payouts that provide cash and non-cash compensation upon a triggering event such as demotion, termination, or forced resignation (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003) . These payouts have become increasingly popular in the last two decades with the RiskMetrics data set documenting an increase in adoptions from roughly 50% in 1990 to 82% in 2010. 1 While the existing literature (see, e.g., Bebchuk, Cohen, and Wang, 2010) focuses on compensation contracts which apply only when a change in control occurs (e.g., referred to as golden parachutes), upon examining a number of recent proxy filings we find that these contracts typically include a payout whenever the CEO is terminated. 2 In this paper, we examine the effect of severance agreements on CEO incentives with respect to risk and effort, and we show how the presence of these agreements in compensation contracts affects the firm's cost of debt capital.
In contrast to our focus on CEO incentives and the cost of debt, the existing literature on severance agreements mostly considers the effects of golden parachutes on takeovers and stock prices. For instance, Machlin, Choe, and Miles (1993) , and Lambert and Larcker (1995) show that golden parachutes imply a greater takeover probability, while Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004) show that greater payouts to the CEO are associated with lower acquisition premia. An early event study by Lambert and Larcker (1985) finds a positive shareholder response to the adoption of golden parachutes; but a more recent study by Brusa, Lee, and Shook (2009) finds that golden parachute adoption is a negative event, and more negative for more generous agreements. Recently, Bebchuk, Cohen, and Wang (2010) document that golden parachutes are associated with a decrease in firm value, a greater likelihood of acquisition, and a lower acquisition premium. Overall, the literature finds mixed evidence on the relation between golden parachutes and shareholder wealth.
We hypothesize that since severance agreements provide a large payment in the event of termination, CEOs have an incentive to increase firm risk and decrease effort, and that these changes in risk and effort lead to an increase in CEO turnover. Lys, Rusticus, and Sletten (2007) 3 argue that, when managers are risk averse, the use of large severance agreements provides downside protection in addition to rewards for exceptional stock performance. This downside protection induces managers to undertake risky projects. Yermack (2006) provides evidence that firms are motivated to adopt golden handshakes to mitigate managerial problems including inadequate risk-taking, shirking, entrenchment in office, and incomplete disclosure. Similarly, Rau and Xu (2010) find that contingent severance pay is promised in advance for managers to provide insurance for their human capital value and compensate them for the risks they undertake.
The literature also provides evidence about how the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) governance index of shareholder rights is associated with decreased effort. Core, Guay, and Rusticus (2006) examine the association between corporate governance, as proxied by the Gompers et al. (2003) index of shareholder rights, and operating performance. Core et al. find a significant negative association between governance and return on assets, which suggests that badly governed firms have greater agency costs. Additionally, Bertrand and Mullainaithan (2003) find that managers who are more insulated from the takeover market are less likely to take risks and more likely to "enjoy the quiet life."
Using the RiskMetrics data set covering the period from 1990 through 2009, we examine the effect of severance agreements on firm risk, operating performance, and executive turnover.
We find that firms which add a severance agreement in their CEO compensation contracts see a significant increase in idiosyncratic risk, and this holds when we control for endogeneity using an instrumental variable approach and if we exclude firms which later faced takeover attempts. 3 Similarly, we find some evidence that firms which remove severance agreements from their CEO compensation contracts see a decline in idiosyncratic risk. We also examine the relation between operating performance and severance agreements using the method in Core, Guay and Rusticus (2006) and find that firms with severance agreements have weaker industry-adjusted returns on assets. Moreover, we find that firms with severance agreements are more likely to have the CEO leave the firm, and again this holds even if we exclude firms which faced a takeover attempt. Overall, these findings are consistent with an increase in risk and a decrease in effort for CEOs with severance agreements.
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Next, we examine the relation between the presence of severance agreements in CEO contracts and the cost of debt financing. We focus on the debt market because of its sheer size and its dissemination of information to the real economy. 4 We posit that the increase in risk and decrease in effort would lead to an increase in the firm's bond yield spreads, and that this relation would persist even after controlling for the probability of takeover. Using data from the Lehman Brothers Fixed Income database and the TRACE data set, we confirm our hypothesis. Specifically, we find a significant positive relation; firms in which the CEO has a severance agreement have yield spreads which are about 10% higher than similar firms without severance agreements. This result is robust to controlling for other governance characteristics, firm-specific fixed effects, the likelihood of acquisition, whether the severance agreement is new or old, and whether the firm has investment or non-investment grade debt.
Our paper contributes to the literature on the effect of severance agreements on security prices. We provide evidence that the use of severance agreements is associated with a higher cost of debt, and confirm our findings using several robustness tests. 5 Moreover, we show that the increase in the cost of debt associated with severance agreements coincides with an increase in firm risk, a decrease in profitability, and an increase in CEO turnover. Our finding that severance agreements increase the cost of borrowing complements the results of Bebchuk, Cohen, and Wang (2010) , who find that firms whose CEOs have a golden parachutes also have a lower industry-adjusted Tobin's Q. Moreover, Bebchuk et al. find that firm value declines during the period of a golden parachute adoption and continues to erode subsequently.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops our hypotheses and provides background literature of the relation between severance agreements and firm value.
Section 3 discusses the data and variable measurements. Section 4 provides our multivariate analyses and empirical results. Section 5 concludes. 4 In addition, for bonds causality is unlikely to be an issue. That is, a change in whether the firm has a severance agreement can cause yields to change, but it is less likely that changes in yield spreads will cause firms to adopt or remove severance agreements from their compensation contracts. Our econometric tests find no evidence of endogeneity in the yield spread specifications. A Durbin-Wu-Hausman test is unable to reject the null hypothesis that severance agreements are exogenous in the cost of debt specification (see the empirical analysis below). 5 The evidence that severance agreements are not beneficial to bondholders contrasts with the prior findings that a higher value to the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) governance index is associated with a decrease in the cost of debt (e.g., Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell, 2005, and Cremers, Nair, and Wei, 2007) . However, as we explain below, the incentive effects of severance agreements differ from those of other components of the governance index.
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Severance Agreements and Firm Behavior
We begin our analysis by providing an intuitive discussion of the implications of severance agreements for CEO behavior. More formal models of effort, risk-taking, and incentives exist (see, e.g., Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987; Prendergast, 2002) . A few papers also theoretically address how severance agreements are related to management compensation and effort (see, e.g., Lys, Rusticus, and Sletten, 2007; and Rau and Xu, 2010; or Lambert and Larcker, 1985; and Knoeber, 1986 , for models about golden parachutes); however, we believe that the implications here are sufficiently straight-forward that a formal model is not necessary.
Severance Agreements, Takeovers, Risk, and Effort
The literature discusses two reasons for the perceived positive relation between compensation contracts such as golden parachutes and takeovers. The incentive alignment hypothesis states that golden parachutes help resolve the conflict of interest between shareholders and management with respect to takeovers, thereby increasing the likelihood of a takeover (see, e.g., Lambert and Larcker 1985; Harris 1990; Machlin, Choe, and Miles, 1993; Bebchuk, Cohen, and Wang, 2010) . In contrast, the takeover signaling hypothesis predicts that the positive relation between golden parachutes and takeovers is due to the adoption of a golden parachute conveying management's private information regarding the likelihood of a takeover; the probability a firm will receive a bid is independent of the adoption of a golden parachute. These hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, and Bebchuk, Cohen, and Wang (2010) find evidence consistent with at least some incentive effect. We also find a positive relation between severance agreements and takeovers in our data in the empirical section below.
In a standard principal-agent model, the agent is risk-averse whereas the principal is not.
As we show that the severance agreements we consider are paid whether or not there is a change of control event, this implies a new set of incentives for the CEO. Specifically, CEOs with severance agreements have an incentive to increase risk relative to those who do not have these provisions in their contracts. If the additional risk pays off, the CEO will be compensated for good performance. If the additional risk does not pay off, the firm is more likely to fire the CEO. With a severance agreement, this downside has fewer negative consequences for the CEO as he collects the severance. Thus, all else equal, we hypothesize that the adoption of a 6 severance agreement implies greater firm risk, and that this relation holds even when considering those firms that did not receive a takeover bid.
Similarly, a CEO with a severance agreement may have an incentive to reduce his/her effort. Again, if this lower effort implies that their employment is more likely to be terminated, they may still be able to receive a severance. We therefore hypothesize that severance agreements are associated with lower profitability and with the CEO leaving more often.
Moreover, we hypothesize that this relation also holds when the firm does not receive a takeover bid. 6
Severance Agreements and the Cost of Debt
The existing literature on the relation between severance agreements and equity value focuses on golden parachutes and provides mixed results. Lambert and Larcker (1985) find a positive shareholder response to the adoption of golden parachutes, while Brusa, Lee, and Shook (2009) and Bechuck, Cohen, and Wang (2010) find that golden parachutes are negatively associated with equity value. We instead focus on the effect of severance agreements on debt value. Given our hypotheses above, we discuss the effects of severance agreements on debt through takeovers, risk taking, and CEO effort.
Takeovers can decrease the value of the target firm's debt (see Asquith and Wizman, 1990) , and this effect can be larger for high-grade bonds (see Billet, King, and Mauer, 2004 ). An increase in the probability of a takeover could therefore increase the firm's cost of debt. Moreover, Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004) show that golden parachutes are associated with a larger payout to the CEO and a smaller payout to shareholders. Thus, takeovers associated with golden parachutes may be less advantageous for the firm's other stakeholders. An increase in risk taking would also be associated with a decrease in debt value (Campbell and Taksler, 2003) . Further, CEO turnover is associated with an increase in equity volatility (Clayton, Hartzell, and Rosenberg, 2005) , and an increase in the cost of debt capital (Adams and Mansi, 2009) . Lastly, if the CEO puts in less effort, this may decrease firm value, and this could 7 also imply an increase in the cost of debt. Thus, the theoretical implications of severance agreements on bond value are overwhelmingly negative.
In contrast, other components of the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) governance index decrease the ease of hostile takeovers, and therefore they insulate management from the market for corporate control. Managers with more antitakeover protection may therefore decrease risk (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003) , and this leads to a lower cost of debt (Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell, 2005; Cremers, Nair, and Wei, 2007) .
Data and Variable Measurement
Data Sources and Sample
We use seven databases in our analysis of the effect of severance agreements on the cost of Up to the year 2006, RiskMetrics reported data on antitakeover provisions every two to three years (in the years 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006) . After 2006, the data were available annually. To construct a continuous dataset, we follow the prior literature (e.g., Bebchuk, Cohen and Wang, 2010) and fill the missing years by assuming that the provisions in any given year were in place in the years preceding the publication date. Our initial data sample extends to 2009 and consists of 33,340 firm-year observations. We exclude financial firms with SIC codes from 6000 to 6999 due to the unique structures in these industries and this leaves 28,286 firm year observations for 3,379 unique firms from 1990 to 2009.
For a firm-year observation to be included in our analysis, the firm must be present in the 
Measuring the Cost of Debt Financing
We use the LBFI database to measure a firm's cost of debt for the years 1990 to 2006 and the TRACE database for the years 2007 and onward. The final data set contains month-end security specific information such as bid price, coupon, yield, credit ratings from Moody's and S&P, duration, issue, and maturity dates on nonconvertible bonds that are used in the Lehman Brothers Bond Indexes and bonds that are traded in the Nasdaq market. Securities are included in the Lehman Brothers Bond Indexes based on firm size, liquidity, credit ratings, maturity, and trading frequency. Because the TRACE data set includes only pricing information, we merge the data set with the Fixed Income Securities Database (available from the Wharton Research Securities Database) to obtain debt specific characteristics. We limit our analysis to only the fiscal year-end prices and yields so as to coincide with firm accounting data.
The dependent variable, the log of the yield spread or bond risk premium, is used to measure the cost of debt financing. The yield spread is defined as the difference between the yield to maturity on a corporate bond and the yield to maturity on its duration equivalent Treasury security. For firms with multiple observations in the sample, a weighted average yield spread is computed, with the weight being the amount outstanding for each security divided by the total amount outstanding for all available publicly traded debt. In the cases where no corresponding Treasury yield is available for a given maturity, the yield spread is calculated using an interpolation based on the Svensson (1994) model (or the modified Nelson and Siegel, 1987 , exponential functional form).
Measuring Other Key Variables
We measure severance agreements using a dummy variable that equals one if RiskMetrics reports that the firm has a golden parachute in the compensation contract for its CEO.
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RiskMetrics currently defines a golden parachute as a severance contract payable in the event of a change in control. 8 As mentioned above, when we examine golden parachutes, we find that they typically are not just payable in the event of a change of control. Appendix A provides data and descriptive statistics for 50 randomly chosen firms having golden parachutes in our 2009 sample. We document that 43 out of the 50 firms (or 86%) provide language in their SEC filings to indicate that a severance package will be paid whether or not there is a change in control. On average, the payout with a change in control is double the payout without a change in control, although both payouts are typically significant, and in some cases the regular termination payout is larger than that associated with a change in control. Appendix B provides an example of the language used in a typical proxy filing.
We utilize three additional variables to capture the firm's use of severance agreements: (i) a dummy variable that equals one if a severance agreement is adopted in the current year but is not in place in the previous year based on the filled dataset (Add Severance), and (ii) a dummy variable that equals one if a severance agreement is adopted in a previous year but is not in place in the current year based on the filled dataset (Remove Severance), and (iii) a dummy variable that equals one if a severance agreement is adopted in the current and previous year based on the filled dataset (Keep Severance).
We include the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) We measure takeover attempts and completed acquisitions using two dummy variables.
Takeover attempt is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm receives an initial bid (Attempt).
Acquisition is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is acquired (Completed Acquisition).
For our analysis on takeover attempts and acquisitions, we obtain mergers and acquisitions data for the years 1988 to 2011 from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC Platinum). We extend the mergers and acquisitions data two years beyond our original sample period to ensure that initial bids and completed acquisitions are precisely defined. We include all acquisitions deals coded as "mergers, acquisitions, and acquisitions of majority interest" and exclude spinoff acquisitions. Following Bates and Lemmon (2003) Specifically, we obtain daily stock price from CRSP to calculate daily stock returns for each firm in the sample over the period 1990 to 2009. The firm's daily stock return is the dependent variable in the market model. We use the CRSP value weighted market portfolio as a proxy for market returns and adjust for non-synchronous trading by adding five leads and five lags of this proxy (Dimson, 1979) . For the performance analysis, we follow Core, Guay, and Rusticus (2006) and use three measures: operating income before depreciation scaled by total assets (ROA1), operating income after depreciation scaled by total assets (ROA2), and firm annual sales growth (Sales Growth). All three measures are computed net of the industry median using the Fama and French (1997) industry classifications.
Control Variables
The remaining variables are firm and security specific controls. Firm-specific controls include firm size, leverage, profitability, market-to-book, capital expenditures, sales growth, and volatility. Firm size (Size), a proxy for economics of scale and a takeover deterrent, is measured as the natural log of total assets. Firm leverage (Leverage), a proxy for financial health, is measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets. Firm profitability (Profitability), a proxy for financial performance, is measured as the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization scaled by total assets. Sales growth (SGrowth) is the firm's annual growth in revenue. Market-to-book ratio, a proxy for growth opportunities, is computed as the market value of assets (measured as the number of shares outstanding times share price plus the book value of debt) scaled by the book value of assets. Volatility is the square root of the annualized variance of the residuals from the market model. Given a small number of extreme observations and to ensure that outliers are not driving any of our results, the variables size, leverage, market to book, and profitability are winsorized at the 1% level.
Security specific variables include credit ratings, duration, convexity, and liquidity. Firm credit rating (Rating) is the average of Moody's and S&P bond ratings and represents the average firm credit rating at the date of the yield observation. 9 Bond ratings are computed using a conversion process in which AAA rated bonds are assigned a value of 22 and D rated bonds receive a value of 1. 10 One methodology used in the literature allows for the fact that the credit rating variable may incorporate part or all of the information from governance factors.
As such, we estimate the impact of credit rating excluding the effect of severance. That is, we regress the rating variable on the severance variable, and the error term in this case incorporates the credit rating information without the influence or impact of severance agreements. In this first stage we find that severance agreements are negatively and significantly related to credit ratings. The error term from this regression is labeled (Credit Rating) and is our primary measure of credit ratings in the multivariate analysis (for a similar analysis, see Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell, 2005, or Qi, Roth, and Wald, 2010) . 11 We control for term structure effects using debt duration and convexity, and for liquidity effects using debt age. For an individual security, duration (Debt Duration) is defined as the discounted time weighted cash flow of the security divided by its price, and this captures the first derivative of price with respect to yield. Debt convexity is the rate of change (second derivative) in the price-yield relation and represents the non-linear portion of the term structure of interest rates. To proxy for liquidity, we use the log of bond age (Debt Age), where the age of the bond is the length of time (in years) that a bond has been outstanding. For firms with multiple bonds, we compute weighted average durations, convexities, and age using the summation of the weighted durations, convexities, and debt ages of all bonds for each firm, with the weight being the amount outstanding for each debt issue divided by total amount outstanding for all publicly traded debt for the firm.
We also control for various governance structures that are known to effect takeovers and the cost of debt financing. These include institutional holdings, Delaware incorporation, and state laws restricting payouts. Institutional ownership is the ratio of shares owned by institutions divided by the total number of shares outstanding. Delaware incorporation is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is incorporated in Delaware. Our variable for state laws restricting payouts is the total asset constraint, equal to the minimum asset to debt ratio for a payout to be made. The prior literature shows that these laws affect capital structure (Wald and Long, 2007) and the cost of debt (Mansi, Maxwell, and Wald, 2009 We also utilize CEO age, measured as the age of CEO at the year of observation while in office, in various specifications. We follow Jenter and Lewellen (2010) who find that retirement preferences of target CEOs have first-order effects on both bidder and target behavior, and use a dummy variable for the age of CEO in excess of 65 years (CEO Age > 65) as an additional control variable. CEO tenure is the number of years a CEO has been in office. We also consider two additional variables: a dummy variable that equals one if a CEO left the firm (CEO Leaves Firm), and a dummy variable that equals one if a CEO left her office (CEO Leaves Office).
Finally, given that our variables are sensitive to both time periods and industry effects, we control for both effects using two-digits SIC code and year dummies. Table 1 provides a complete description of the variables used in the analysis.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Descriptive Statistics
Incidence of Severance Agreements, Takeover attempts, and Acquisitions
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We begin the analysis by considering how the incidence of severance agreements changes over time. Panel A of Table 2 [Insert Panel B of Table 2 about here]
Sample Statistics
Panel C of Table 2 reports summary statistics for the overall sample as well as statistics segmented based on whether a firm has adopted a severance agreement or not. Included are the mean, median, and standard deviation for the overall sample and for the segmented samples. In the cost of debt analysis we consider the yield spread which has a mean, median, and standard deviation in the overall sample of 316, 187, and 472 basis points, respectively.
Firms with severance contracts have higher yield spreads (mean and median values 318, and 196 basis points) than those without severance contracts (mean and median values of 312 and 175 basis points). Moreover, the mean differences between the two groups are statistically significant at the 1% level. Since the mean and median values deviate largely from one another, the yield spread variable is highly skewed. Therefore, we use the log of the yield rather than the level yield spread value in our multivariate analysis to provide a better fit and to insure that any fitted values remain positive. 12
[Insert Panel C of Table 2 about here]
For the overall sample, firm size has a mean of $5.6 billion, a median of $1.3 billion, and a standard deviation of $21.8 billion, respectively. The median leverage (short term plus long term debt) ratio is 44.7% with a standard deviation of 22.4%, which indicates that a large portion of the sample consist of firms that have significant liabilities in their capital structure.
The firms are profitable with a mean and median profitability ratio of 13.1%. Firms on average, have a market-to-book ratio of 1.77. Firms in the sample have idiosyncratic risk of 49.1%.
Institutions, on average, owned 63.9% of the shares outstanding with a standard deviation of 24.4%. Firms have a mean and median governance index of 9 provisions and a median entrenchment index of 2 provisions. CEOs, on average, own 2.5% of the firm's shares, have tenure of 7.4 years, and are 56 years old. The remaining variables are security specific. The mean bond rating variable for the full sample roughly equates to an S&P rating of BBB-and the median equates to a rating of BBB, which indicates a mean rating just above non-investment grade debt. Bond ratings are lower for the sample with severance agreements than for the sample without these agreements, and the difference between the two samples is statistically significant. The mean traded debt has duration of 6.15 years and has been outstanding for 3.6 years.
In terms of takeover variables, 5.6% of firms in the overall sample experience a takeover attempt in a given year with 4.1% completing the acquisitions. In the segmented sample, 6.4% of firms with severance agreements experience a takeover attempt compared to 4.3% of firms without severance agreements, and 4.9% of firms with severance agreements complete an acquisition compared to 2.8% of firms without severance agreements. This difference in takeover frequencies is statistically significant at the 1% level and it is consistent with the findings in the literature reporting a positive association between the presence of severance agreements and the incidence of takeover attempts and completed acquisitions (Machlin, Choe, and Miles, 1993; Bebchuk, Cohen, and Wang, 2010) . Table 2 describes the industry distribution of the sample using the Security Industry Classification (SIC) codes for the overall sample and segmented by firms that adopt golden parachutes and those who do not. Although we use two digit SIC codes to control for industry effects in our empirical analysis, for brevity we only report one digit SIC codes in our descriptive analysis. Based on our segmentation, it seems that there are no majors differences in the concentration of industries between the two samples. Most of the firms in the overall sample are in manufacturing (52%), transportation and communications (15%), services (14%), and whole trade sectors (13%). The smallest concentrations of firms occur in the agriculture and forestry and public administration sectors.
Panel D of
[Insert Panel D of Table 2 about here] Table 2 provides the Pearson correlation coefficients between the golden parachute variable, yield spreads, and selected control measures. In general, the yield spread is positively correlated with the severance agreement variable, entrenchment index, firm leverage, and idiosyncratic risk. Yield spreads are negatively related to firm size, governance index, institutional ownership, profitability, credit ratings, and debt duration. The analysis also indicates that firms that adopt severance agreements have a have higher cost of borrowing.
However, because of possible confounding effects by other variables, we use a multivariate framework to fully explore our hypotheses.
[Insert Panel E of Table 2 about here]
Empirical Results
Evidence on the Relation between Severance Agreements and Takeovers
We provide a probit analysis to examine the relation between severance agreements and the likelihood of takeovers (attempts and completed acquisitions) while controlling for firm characteristics, industry (using 2 digit SIC codes), and year effects. This verifies the prior findings that the presence of golden parachutes is positively related to the incidence of 
Where F is the normal c.d.f. The primary variable of interest in the analysis is the coefficient on severance agreements. A positive value on β1 indicates a higher probability of takeover attempts/acquisitions if a severance agreement is in place. Table 3 presents the estimation results. Models 1 and 2 provide the results on takeover attempts and completed acquisitions, respectively. We utilize two different sets of control variables from Bebchuk, Cohen and Wang (2010). We also control for whether the firm is incorporated in Delaware as Delaware state laws are often perceived as being management friendly. We use a dummy variable that equals one if the CEO's age is greater than 65 to control of the CEO's retirement preferences.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Overall, the results indicate a positive and significant relation between severance agreements and the likelihood of takeover attempts/acquisitions. Across the two models the likelihood of a firm receiving an initial bid increases by 16% and the likelihood of a firm getting acquired increases by 17% when the firm adopts a severance agreement. 13 This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that severance agreements provide incentive for managers to engage in acquisitions. The remaining control variables applicable to the two models have their expected signs. The entrenchment index less severance variable has a negative and significant coefficient. Firm size acts as a takeover deterrent as larger firms have a lower probability of takeover. A higher level of leverage increases the likelihood of receiving an initial bid but decrease the likelihood of being acquired. The coefficient on pre-bid target abnormal returns is negative and significant at the 5% level in the takeover attempt regressions; however this coefficient is positive and insignificant in the likelihood of completed acquisition regressions.
Interestingly, the coefficients on both Delaware incorporation and CEO age greater than 65 are both positive and significant in all models. Table 4 presents our results of different specifications with idiosyncratic risk as a function of whether the firm has a severance agreement. We include the entrenchment index without severance agreements, market-to-book, firm size, and leverage as firm specific control variables.
Evidence on Firm Risk, Operating Performance, and CEO Turnover
Severance Agreements and Idiosyncratic Risk
As in Brick, Palmon, and Wald (2012) we use lagged firm idiosyncratic risk to control for autocorrelation. Model 1 summarizes the result of the idiosyncratic risk regression including the Add Severance variable. Low (2009) finds that managers change firm idiosyncratic risk in responses to a takeover regime shift, in her case, the Delaware takeover regime of the mid1990s. Similarly, we hypothesize that a CEO has an incentive to increase firm risk if the firm adds a severance agreement and decrease firm risk if the firm removes an existing severance.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
The coefficient on Add Severance in Model 1 of Table 4 is positive and significant at the 1% level. This regression implies that on average a firm which adopts a severance agreement increases the annualized idiosyncratic variance of its stock return by about 7.3%. The set of other entrenchment antitakeover provisions also has a significant impact on idiosyncratic risks, however, in the opposite direction. In particular, if a firm adopts one more entrenchment antitakeover provision, aside from severance, the annualized idiosyncratic variance of its stock returns decreases by 3%. We also examine the relation between severance agreements and systematic risk and in general do not find significant results.
One alternative reason that severance agreements imply greater stock volatility is that they lead to more takeovers, not because they lead to more risk taking by the manager. We therefore explicitly consider the subsample of firm-year observations where there is no takeover attempt.
Model 2 reports the results for the subsample where no takeover attempts took place, and the results are unchanged for our coefficients of interest. Model 3 reports the results from a model where the firm changes its governance policy by removing a severance agreement. We find weak support for the hypothesis that managers decrease idiosyncratic risks when a firm removes a severance agreement. The coefficient on the Remove Severance variable is negative and significant at the 10% level.
Endogeneity is a possible concern in this analysis, as firms with higher volatility may be more likely to adopt severance agreements. 14 We therefore consider several potential instruments for severance agreements and test their validity using a difference-in-Sargan test statistic. We find that whether the CEO is younger than 51 (as in Jenter and Lewellen, 2010) and whether the firm was incorporated in Delaware in the prior year are both potentially valid instruments. 15 We then perform a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for whether the severance agreement variable is endogenous and find evidence that it is. We therefore re-estimate our primary specification using an instrumental variable method, and we report the results in Model 4 of Table 4 . 16 The coefficient on Add Severance is again positive and significant, and the magnitude is much larger than without using instrumental variables. That said, the coefficient here is surprisingly large, implying an idiosyncratic risk increase of almost 150%. This large coefficient may be due to a bias from using instrumental variables with weak instruments in finite samples (see, for instance, Hahn and Hausman, 2003) , and given the magnitude of this coefficient, these results should be interpreted with caution.
An alternative hypothesis is that CEOs have an incentive to reduce effort if a severance agreement is in place, and this leads to greater turnover. The increase we find in stock volatility could then be due to changes in CEO turnover as Clayton, Hartzell, and Rosenberg (2005) show that CEO turnover implies greater stock return variability. We therefore repeat our analyses in Models 5 through 7 excluding any firm-years in which the CEO left the firm. The results are similar across the models with the addition of a severance agreement implying an increase in firm risk in the range of 7% to 8%. The decrease in firm risk after the deletion of a severance agreement is no longer significant for this sample; however, the estimated coefficient on the Remove Severance variable is effectively unchanged. 17
Severance Agreements and Operating Performance
Recent research by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and Core, Guay, and Rusticus (2006) suggests that weak governance gives rise to agency costs which in turn lower operating performance. Consistent with this hypothesis, these authors document that weak governance is associated with lower operating performance. We extend their analysis by examining the relation between the adoption of a severance agreement (as a measure of poor incentives) and operating performance (as a proxy for CEO effort). That is, we measure whether firms whose CEOs have severance agreements have weaker cash flows than firms whose CEOs do not. We where performance is one of three measures: (i) industry adjusted ROA before depreciation (ROA1), (ii) industry adjusted ROA after depreciation (ROA2), and (iii) industry adjusted annual sales growth (Ind. Adj. Sales Growth). The independent variables (all lagged one period) include SeveranceAgreement, a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has a severance agreement in the current period, EIndex-Severance is the entrenchment index less severance agreement, logMVE is the log of market value of equity, and logBME is the log of book to market value of equity. A negative value on β1 indicates that the presence of a severance agreement is associated with lower operating performance.
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We utilize the methodology in Fama and McBeth (1973) and Core et al. (2006) and estimate the regressions by year and report mean and standard deviation of the time series as well as tstatistics of the overall regressions. The results for our three measure of operating performance are provided in Table 5 . In all three models we find a negative and significant relation between the use of severance agreements and firm performance. The evidence shows that the use of severance agreements in the current period is associated with lower operating performance in the subsequent period, and this is consistent with severance agreements implying decreased CEO effort.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Severance Agreements and CEO Turnover
We next consider whether severance agreements impact the frequency of CEO turnover. Table 6 summarizes the results of probit regressions where CEO turnover is the dependent variable. Model 1 is our basic specification and includes the effect of severance agreements on CEO turnover. Model 2 is similar to Model 1 but only consider a subsample with no takeover attempts. Model 3 provides results where the dependent variable is whether the CEO left her office, rather than leaving the firm. Model 4 is similar to Model 3 but again only considers the subsample with no takeover attempts.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
The results in Model 1 confirm the effect of a severance agreement in the previous year on the likelihood of CEO turnover in the current year. In particular, if a severance agreement is in effect in the prior year, the likelihood that the CEO leaves the firm this year will increase by 13%. In Model 2, the coefficient of a golden parachute is generally the same in both its magnitude and significance. The results from Models 3 and 4 which examine whether the CEO left their position (rather than leaving the firm) are also similar; if a severance agreement is adopted last year, the likelihood of CEOs leaving their position this year will increase by about 10%, and this finding is significant at the 5% or 10% level depending on specification. Overall, across all models the results indicate a higher likelihood of CEO departure if a severance agreement is in place.
Evidence on the Relation between Severance Agreements and the Cost of Debt
Next, we examine the relation between the presence of severance agreements and bond yield spreads while controlling for other factors that are known to influence yield spreads. We perform multivariate regressions using a variety of pooled cross-section and time-series as well as firm fixed effects regressions. We use clustered standard errors at the firm level as in
Petersen (2009) to compute the t-statistics. Our primary regression model is
Ln(Spreadi,t)= B0 +B1 (SeveranceAgreementsi,t)+B2 (EIndex -Severance i,t)+B3-8 (FirmSpecifici,t) +B9-12 (Security Specific i,t) + B13 (TA Constrainti,t) + B14-32 (Time_Dumi,t) + B33-40 (Industry_Dumi,t) + ei,t (2)
Our principal concern in the analysis is the severance agreement coefficient estimate, B1. A significant and positive coefficient would provide support for the hypothesis that severance agreements are value decreasing to bondholders.
For our control variables, we expect both firm size and firm age to be negatively related to yield spread as larger firms enjoy economies of scale and greater stability. Leverage should be positively related to yield spreads, as higher debt capacity is associated with a higher probability of default. The market-to-book ratio should be negatively associated with yield spreads as firms with higher growth opportunities utilize less debt and therefore lower probability of default. We expect sales growth and firm profitability to be negatively related to the cost of debt financing, as more profitable firms have a lower probability of default. We expect credit ratings to be negatively associated with yield spreads as firms with better ratings have a lower probability of default and therefore lower cost of borrowing. We expect debt age to be positively related to yield spreads as bonds that are less liquid require higher rate of return. We also include institutional ownership as a control for the governance structure of the firm and expect institutional ownership to be associated with a lower cost of borrowing due to increased monitoring (Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003) . Table 7 summarizes the results of our regressions of the impact of severance agreements on the cost of debt financing. Model 1 provides our primary specification. Model 2 considers whether the severance agreement provision was recently adopted or was previously in existence. Model 3 is similar to Model 1 but includes the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) governance index instead of the entrenchment index of Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009).
Model 4 reports the primary specification with firm fixed effects similar to that in Coles, Lemmon, and Meschke (2003) . Model 5 utilizes an unfilled sample as in Bebchuk et al. (2010), where we do not replace years without governance data by the governance data in the last available year.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
Across all specifications, we find a positive and significant relation (at the 1%level) between severance agreements and the cost of debt financing, indicating that bondholders view a severance agreement as a device that does not protect their interests. The coefficients across models vary from 0.089 for the unfilled sample to 0.127 for the GIndex specification. This translates to an increase in bond yield spreads of about 9% to 13%, on average, across models.
As an average firm in our sample has a spread of 316 basis points, these estimates imply an increase of 28 to 40 basis points in spread with the adoption of a severance agreement. Note that Model 2 shows that the coefficients on the add and keep severance agreements are positively related to the cost of debt, with a magnitude of 12.3% for the add severance agreement and 10.2% for the keep severance agreement. We cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficients on these two variables are equal. Overall, the results indicate that severance agreements are not beneficial to bondholders, and this is reflected in lower pricing of corporate Therefore, to insure that our results are robust to this reporting variability, we also reran the cost of debt regressions for a sub-sample of firms for the period from 1990 through 2006. 18 The results for this sub-sample, provided in Appendix C, are similar to the overall sample and confirm our finding of a positive and significant relation between severance agreements and the cost of debt financing.
We do not expect endogeneity to be a concern in this analysis as we do not expect bond spreads to impact the use severance agreements. However, in order to test this assumption, we again consider an instrumental variable approach using CEO age and Delaware incorporation as instruments. A Durbin-Wu-Hausman test is unable to reject the null hypothesis that severance agreements are exogenous in the cost of debt specification.
The control variables across all models have their theoretically predicted signs, and in general, are statistically significant. We find that firm size, sales growth, profitability, growth opportunities, and the total asset constraint are negatively associated with yield spreads, while firm leverage and stock volatility are positively related to bond yield spreads. Our debt specific variables (credit ratings, debt convexity, debt age) are all positively related to spreads. Similar to the results of Bohjraj and Sengupta (2005), we find that institutional ownership is negatively related to yield spreads, and this evidence is consistent with monitoring.
We also provide additional robustness tests in Table 8 . We are particularly concerned with whether severance agreements affect bond spreads purely because of the increase in takeover probability, or whether severance agreements impact bond spreads because of changes in risk and CEO effort. If the effect of severance agreements is purely due to takeovers, we would expect to estimate a more positive coefficient when considering yields of high-grade debt, whereas the estimated coefficient for a sample of low-grade or junk debt might be negative or insignificant (Billet, King, and Mauer, 2004 , show the differential impacts of takeovers on differently rated bonds). Models 1 and 2 therefore segment the sample into investment and non-investment grade debt. Similar to our level specification, we find a positive and significant association between the adoption of severance agreements and the cost of debt financing, albeit slightly lower economic results for the investment sample of about 7% vs. 11% for the noninvestment sample. These results suggest that the effect of severance agreements on yield spreads is not due to takeover risk.
[Insert Table 8 about here]
Next, we directly control for the probability of takeover by first using the estimated 24 probability of a takeover attempt or acquisition as an additional control variable. Models 3 and 4 add these additional estimated probabilities. 19 As in our other specifications, the estimated coefficients on severance agreement continue to be positive and significant after controlling for the predicted probability of takeovers, although the estimated coefficient is slightly lower. A higher probability of takeover also implies a slightly higher spread, although this result is not significant. Again, the results show that severance agreements are associated with higher yield spreads, and that this relation cannot be explained purely by an increase in takeover risk.
We note that in this analysis the overall effect of severance agreements on spreads may be understated since severance agreements also imply higher volatility and more takeovers. That is, as the regressions control for past volatility and perceived takeover risk, the marginal effect of severance agreements that we capture in the regressions provided in Table 8 is due only to perceived future incentives. As both volatility and takeovers are positively related to spreads, this potentially underestimates the full magnitude of severance agreements on yield spreads.
Conclusion
Recently, under the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, a great deal of attention has been given to provisions in compensation contracts. Severance agreements are payments assigned to senior executives upon a triggering event such as termination, demotion, or resignation. In this paper, we examine the effect of severance agreements on CEO incentives with respect to risk and effort and show how severance agreements affect the firm's cost of debt capital.
Using governance data from RiskMetrics, we document that firms whose CEOs are given severance agreements become riskier, have worse operating performance, and that these firms are more likely to replace the CEO. These changes are consistent with severance agreements leading to an increase in risk taking and a decrease in effort by the CEO. Using bond market data, we also show that the adoption of a severance agreement in compensation contracts is associated with an increase in the cost of debt capital, and again this is consistent with greater risk taking and a decrease in CEO effort. Thus, this study provides evidence that the adoption of severance agreements leads not only to an increase in takeovers but also extends to other firm Note. This table provides results from regressing the severance agreement variable on the median industry-adjusted ROA and Sales Growth. ROA is the ratio of operating income scaled by total assets. We measure operating income in two ways: before and after depreciation (ROA1 and ROA2). Sales Growth is annual sale growth in the firm's total revenue. Control variables include entrenchment index less severance, log of book-to-market equity, and log of market value of equity. All control variables are lagged one year. We use the Newey-West procedure with one lag to adjust for serial correlation and compute the time-series mean of coefficients and standard deviation and t-statistics for the average of the coefficients. The notations a , b , c denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All coefficents are multiplied by 100. Gompers et al. (2003) index of antitakeover rights less Entrenchment index (GIndex-EIndex), log of book value of assets (Firm Size), long-term debt scaled by book value assets (Leverage), the market value of assets divided by their book value (Market-to-Book), earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization scaled by total assets (Profitability), Annual sales growth ( Sales Growth), square root of the annualized variance of the residuals from the market model (Volatility), number of shares held by institutions scaled by common shares outstanding (Institutional Ownership), average of Moody's and S&P ratings, computed using a scale between 22 and 1 (Rating), orthogonalized ratings variable (Credit Rating), log of number of years since bond issuance (Bond Age), Macaulay duration or security's effective maturity (Debt Duration), second derivative of price with respect to yield (Debt Convexity), and Notes. This table provides descriptive statistics for the sample of 50 firms above. Variables include: the value of the golden parachute reported in the proxy statement, the ratio of the non-change in control payout to the change in control payout, and the ratio of golden parachute to total CEO compensation.
